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“The world changes and technology comes and goes but human
problems remain the same.”
-Enid Mumford (2003, p.1)
Enid Mumford devoted her career to promoting the ethical use of computers. She founded her work on ethics, socio-technical and
general systems theory, and action research. These foundations translated into four principles underlying all her work: (1)
Information systems should be designed to improve the quality of life for all. (2) Individuals should be able to participate in
designing their own working circumstances and information systems. (3) Solutions to local problems have global consequences.
(4) All research should include action to improve the situation being studied. Enid Mumford’s legacy extends from ethical
information system design to complex problem solving in the global era. This paper is an interview of Enid Mumford at her home
in the United Kingdom in the summer of 2003 with a brief introduction to the theoretical foundations of her thinking, her research
and her legacy to the information systems research field.
Keywords: ethics, ethical use of technology, human use of computers, socio-technical theory, general systems theory, participative
design, organizational change, computer-based information system design, holistic approach, complex problem solving,
information systems research, action research.

* This is a part of the special issue on Enid Mumford’s contribution to information systems theory and theoretical thinking.
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The Four Theoretical Foundations of Enid Mumford’s Work
Enid Mumford built her body of work on four theoretical foundations: ethics, socio-technical theory, general systems theory,
and action research. First and foremost, Enid believed that computers should be used to improve the quality of life for all
humankind not just the wealthy or powerful. Until the very end, she continued to be concerned that even the most modern
information systems harness employees into monotonous, repetitive, and fractionalized work practices undermining the
working individual’s quality of life. Enid turned all her projects into a quest for implementing universal good and kindness.
Equally consistently, Enid applied the socio-technical theory and the general systems theory in her research. A central
concept in the general systems theory is an “open system.” At a practical level, this leads to recognizing that every system is
embedded in its environment, which inherently affects the way it behaves. In a socio-technical context, an “open system”
means that every employee changes as part of his/her work group, which in turn adapts to its department, the firm, and the
global business environment (Mumford, 2003). Similarly, it means that an addict changes as part of his/her addict
affiliations and dealer networks, which in turn adapt to international drug empires (Mumford, 1999). As a result of buying
into the two theories, Enid embraced holism and participation as essential characteristics of all her research. Solutions
would emerge from understanding the systemic dynamics within and between human groupings as a result of dwelling with
affected people as they go about their everyday life.
The fourth foundation of Enid Mumford’s career was action research. In this approach, which she adopted from the
Tavistock Institute, analysis and theory were associated with remedial change (Mumford, 2003). The Tavistock Institute
believed that in the application of socio-technical principles to improving human relations there should be “no therapy
without research and no research without therapy.” To Enid this principle meant that “there should be no theory without
practice and no practice without research” (Mumford, 2003, p.13). Living this principle, Enid frequently facilitated
organizational change according to her research findings. This is evident in the many projects she was involved in. Here we
look at four of (arguably) the most influential.

Four Examples of Mumford’s Work in IS
Turners Asbestos Cement
The first and most important learning experience for Enid came from a project in a British company, Turners Asbestos
Cement, which made products for the construction industry. The company systems analysts were anxious to change the
firm’s sales office from a batch- to a terminal-based system for company accounts. They asked for help, saying that they
wanted to associate good organizational and job design with the new technical system. Mumford undertook a survey of job
satisfaction in the sales office and discussed the results with all the clerks, bringing them together in small groups. At these
meetings, a large number of organizational problems emerged, and it was suggested to the clerks that they should think
about how these might be solved.
Mumford forgot about this request and fed back the results of the survey to members of the technical design group. They
then designed what they thought was an excellent socio-technical system. They called a meeting of all the clerks, described
their proposed system, and sat back and waited for the applause. To their astonishment there was silence. Then one of the
senior clerks stood up and said politely, “Thank you for your presentation, your ideas are good, but while you have been

designing a new work structure for our office we have been doing the same thing, and this is how we would like to be
organized.” He then produced an excellent blueprint for a work structure that solved most of the office’s efficiency and job
satisfaction problems.

It was the clerks’ solution that was implemented and Mumford learned her first important lesson about action research and
participation. That is: never underestimate a group’s abilities. People at any level in a company, if given the opportunity
and some help, can successfully play a major role in designing their own work systems. Ever since then, Mumford has been
convinced of the efficacy of using a participative approach. So much so that she developed the ETHICS methodology,
which stands for Effective Technical and Human Implementation of Computer-based Systems. It was this methodology that
Enid used in subsequent projects involving the analysis, design, and implementation of information systems. (Mumford,
1983)
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Rolls Royce Aerospace
The second major project Enid was involved in was at Rolls Royce. It was typical of the many she carried out after the
Turners Asbestos experience. Rolls Royce Aerospace made aircraft engines and was a large and flourishing company. It had
a purchase invoice department that dealt with the invoices coming in from companies supplying goods and services. This
department had an elderly, low-morale workforce with little motivation to work efficiently. It was shunned by young people
who refused to work in a place they regarded as a graveyard. Rolls Royce had decided to computerize the clerical processes
in this department in an effort to improve efficiency. As Mumford had lectured the Rolls Royce systems group on
participative design on a number of occasions, the IS manager decided to try a participative approach with the new system.
A user design group was created with representatives from each section of the department together with the systems analyst
responsible for the project. Mumford acted as the facilitator to the group, and one of the senior clerks was chosen by the
members as their chairman. At the same time the senior purchase invoice manager held small group meetings with their
constituents to consider more deeply the reasons for these efficiency and job satisfaction difficulties and to discuss possible
solutions. Gradually, the work changes required in the department became clear and were documented as important
objectives for the new system. The steering committee discussed these and approved them.
The systems analyst accepted the task of creating a technical system that would assist the achievement of these objectives,
and the design group turned its attention to identifying three alternative organizational structures that would help to secure
the required improvements. Two of these were based on the socio-technical approach of multi-skilled work teams, each
responsible for a relatively self-contained aspect of the department’s work.
After discussion with the steering committee and a meeting with all the clerks in the department chaired by the trade union
official, an organizational structure was selected in which teams of clerks would look after all the procedures and personal
relations for specific groups of suppliers. Clerks in these teams would aim to become multi-skilled within a time period of
two years. A number of clerks in the department saw this new structure as too demanding and asked if they could remain on
routine work. Consequently, the organization created service centre was therefore created to handle routine processes such
as dealing with the circulation of mail. It was hoped that this would be a temporary structure, with all clerks eventually
becoming multi-skilled.
This new structure transformed the department from a low-morale group shunned by young employees to a motivated and
knowledgeable group that became of great interest to those departments in Rolls Royce seeking flexible and knowledgeable
staff. Here was another example where a socio-technical approach had led to more freedom in decision making and choice.
This, in turn, led to more freedom in work by providing opportunities for responsibility, learning, and greater control and
autonomy (Mumford, 1996; Mumford and Henshall, 1979).
Mumford’s action research with Turners Asbestos Cement and Rolls Royce were two examples from the seventies that are
representative of participative projects carried out at the lower levels of companies (Mumford, 1981). In the eighties and
nineties, Mumford increasingly moved the ETHICS approach up the organizational hierarchy. The next example shows how
a major computer manufacturer, Digital Equipment Corporation, used participative design to create XSEL, one of its first
expert systems intended to assist configuring in sales offices throughout the world. The challenge of the project was the size
of the user group and the fact that it was located in many different countries.

Digital Equipment Corporation
When computers are manufactured, numerous parts have to be brought together and assembled, and, because there are
so many parts, some can be lost, or assembled incorrectly. Because of this, a customer who receives a new tailor-made
machine may find that it does not work, causing a serious deterioration in the relations between customer and supplier.
Digital’s attempts to solve this problem had failed, and the company believed that an expert system, acting as an electronic
aide memoire, could be the answer.
In the early eighties, Digital built and installed an expert system called XCON in its manufacturing plants. This provided a
graphic display of how different parts should fit together. It was very successful, and the engineers who built the computers
welcomed it. Unfortunately, it did not solve the configuring problem completely because the problem originated in the sales
offices. Each salesperson had to detail all the parts in a system ordered by a customer: first, to give the customer an
accurate estimate of how much the machine and peripherals would cost, and second, to send a specification to the
manufacturing plant stating exactly what the customer wanted. Few of the sales staff were engineers, and they often
identified the specifications inaccurately, causing mistakes in assembly that the manufacturing staff could not identify. These
configuring errors caused Digital losses of millions of dollars a year. As a result, the company developed an expert system
for use by sales staff.
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XSEL was designed with considerable user participation. The design group contained both technical experts and members of
the sales force. It met regularly during the design and implementation stages and for some time after the system was
installed.
In addition to the group discussions, managers employed two questionnaires to assess job satisfaction and efficiency needs,
with the analysis of efficiency needs based on Stafford Beer’s “Viable System Model.” Design was an iterative process, with
the sales force specifying their information needs, the technical members building an embryonic system for them to test, and
this process continuing as XSEL grew until the system was regarded as ready to hand over to the sales offices for day-to-day
use. In its mature state XSEL contained 15,000 configuring rules.
Although only some of the sales people could directly participate in the design process meetings and discussions, Digital
kept all the sales offices informed of what was happening through its electronic mail system. Regular reports of progress
were sent out and when there were arguments over strategy that could not be easily resolved, the sales offices were
consulted. Participation meant that when XSEL was ready for implementation, the sales offices were enthusiastic and very
willing to use it. The system was non-threatening, no-one would lose their jobs because of it, and it would prevent sales
people from making embarrassing and costly mistakes.
Despite this initial enthusiasm, the system gradually ceased to be used, and the configuration errors increased in number
again. The problem was both motivational and technical. Over time the sales force felt that there were few benefits in using
XSEL. It added an extra administrative step to their workload when they wanted to focus on ‘electronic selling.’ It was also
slow. A sales person could do an imprecise configuration in his or her head faster than XSEL could work through its 15,000
rules.
The Digital project is an example of a socio-technical approach directed at developing new software, not restructuring a
department. It did change the salespeople’s individual work responsibilities but not in a manner they regarded as
improvement. The participative aspect of socio-technical design was successful, but the final product that emerged was not.
Nevertheless the experience of using a socio-technical approach convinced Digital that this was the way to proceed in the
future. They produced a set of guidelines for managing change based on the socio-technical design principles that were
used to manage subsequent projects in other areas (Mumford and MacDonald, 1990).
Mumford’s projects in the nineties were almost all concerned with using a socio-technical approach to assist managers to
select and shape information systems to meet their particular needs. Firms participating in these exercises included KLM and
Dutch Telecom. One of Mumford’s more interesting but difficult cases was that of SKIL, a Dutch company producing power
tools.

SKIL
SKIL was proposing to abandon an old and unsatisfactory computer-based material planning system and to substitute more
advanced software that would run on a new IBM AS 400 machine that the company had recently acquired. Nine managers
were involved in the project—two planning managers, three factory production managers, the finance manager, a quality
manager, and two managers from R&D.
Because most managers are not prepared to devote time to non-production activities, Mumford had reduced the two
questionnaires associated with ETHICS to one and allowed only two days for group discussions. She called this reductionist
approach ‘QUICKethics.’ Mumford went through the QUICKethics questionnaire with each SKIL manager individually,
wrote the interview up, and gave the report back to the individual manager so that he could check its accuracy. These
interviews had a threefold purpose: First, to enable the manager to think clearly and systematically about his role and
responsibilities before considering his information needs; second, to enable him to obtain a clear picture of his information
needs before meeting his colleagues in a group situation; and third, to arouse interest and a sense of ownership in the
proposed new system.
One week after the interviews the managers met as a group. As nine is quite a large number for fast decision making,
Mumford split them into four groups—planning, production, quality and R&D. Each of these groups was asked to think
back to their individual answers from the week before and to agree and prioritize a set of essential information needs. One
member of each group described and explained each list and then the management group as a whole discussed them all.
During the meeting, a board-level manager stated what senior management required: software that did not need more than
15 percent customizing for the company, that could be implemented safely and without risk—there must be no possibility of
plant stoppages—and that was supporting rather than controlling users.
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The last task of the group was to agree on a core information system that could act as a starting point for implementation.
Everyone present agreed that this should cover three items. The first priority was bills of material, which specified in detail
the materials and production steps associated with each product. Second, material planning and machine capacity
planning should have next priority. These were two critical activities essential to the running of the production system. Finally,
it was agreed that the managers, reduced to six in number, should become the user design group for the project. The
exercise was regarded as a success in that it helped SKIL managers to look systematically at their information needs and
decide on an agreed starting point for implementing the new system. This reduced the risk in a high risk situation.
These four examples all demonstrate the importance of the socio-technical philosophy of participation and of the need to
take human issues into account at each stage of the design process. They also show that a socio-technical approach can
be easily adapted to meet the needs of different situations. The cases also show Mumford’s application of action research.
Enid Mumford was an exceptional scholar. The stability and clarity of her four research foundations manifest a highly
developed sense of academic rigor. Enid’s wit, however, ensured that any theory or research approach was just a tool to be
harnessed for a higher, humane purpose. With this introduction, we share our last interview with Enid Mumford at her home
in the United Kingdom in the summer of 2003. The purpose of the interview was to hear her talk about her career, impact,
and the status of human use of computers as she saw these at the time.

The Mumford Interview
We arrived at Manchester jet lagged from the trip from the United States and had just checked into our hotel when Enid
called. In her usual cheery voice she said: “Welcome. Jim1 and I will meet you for afternoon tea.” Thirty minutes later we
were enjoying afternoon tea and exchanging the latest news about our families and friends. At the age of eighty, Enid
showed no signs of slowing down. That night we had a lovely dinner. and early the next morning, we met with Enid again at
her house to spend the day talking about her life and her career.
Question: How did your career start?
Mumford: I was enormously fortunate in the way my career started. My first job was probably the most important job I’ve
had because I became a personnel manager at a very large aircraft factory. I’d only been there about a year when my boss
left and so the firm, being a bit lazy, decided to give me her job rather than look for somebody else. I was responsible for
all the personnel management including industrial relations and for the women’s workforce. For the first job, it was
enormously useful.
Question: What was the next formative step in your career?
Mumford: I got married and my husband Jim was in the Navy, and so we decided to live in Liverpool because he got a job
as a lecturer in the dental school at the university, and I had to look for another job. I had another amazing stroke of luck.
There was a new factory that made alarm clocks and it had a lot of government support because in those early days you
could use alarm clocks for setting off bombs, so it had finance from the Ministry of Defense. And there, I was given a
production management job actually running a department making these alarm clocks and—bomb making equipment—so
moved from personnel management to spending a year as a production manager.
Question: What was your next important career decision?
Mumford: I did not want to be doing that forever and a friend of mine, a psychologist, got a job in the social science
department of Liverpool University, and she said: “Why don’t you apply for a research job?” So I did. I got it, and I worked
for a woman named Joan Woodward who later became very famous. So I had these three amazing starting points in
personnel management industry, in production management, and then in research with a really good person to show me
how to do research.
Question: How did you get interested in computers?
Mumford: When these mysterious things called computers started appearing, nobody had a clue about them or what
impact they would have. There was a big organization called the European Productivity Association, and it decided to run
some research on what was the impact of these weird things. So I started doing research first in a bank and then in a local
factory on the impact of these machines.
Question: How did you choose action research as your research approach?
Mumford: There was another very influential factor at the time, and that was anthropology. British researchers were very
much into anthropology and anthropological techniques where you did not go out waving questionnaires. You actually went
and sat with the group you were studying and became part of them and learned what they were doing. And we did not
know what we were going to learn. Quite famous anthropologists named Madeline Kerr and Tom Lupton were in Liverpool.
1

Enid Mumford’s husband.
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Tom later became the director of Manchester Business School. We were very much into anthropology, so we were never
very attracted to going around waving questionnaires at people. We were much more into going into a group and working
with it and finding out as much as we could about it, which of course I always continued to do.
Question: What did you learn about the approach?
Mumford: I found that it really takes time and it can be hazardous and so on, but you really get to understand the member
of the group and what’s making them tick and why they’re doing things in certain ways.
Question: When did you first come in contact with the Tavistock Institute?
Mumford: Around that time, I met the Director of the Tavistock. He was called Professor Tommy Wilson. I had so much luck
in these early years it’s unbelievable. He sat on a research committee from which I was asking for a grant to do this
research, and he ensured that I got a five-year grant – unbelievable! IT was my first research project and we get a grant for
five years. So that was the start of participative design, and then the Tavistock Institute increasingly moved into participative
dock design, and it suddenly became very famous. So I’ve always kind of had a contact with the Tavistock and have been
influenced in what I was doing by what they were doing. So there were these different influences and practical experiences
running a factory and doing industrial relations along with having contact with anthropology and then getting this big
research grant. Then, soon after that the Manchester Business School started up. It was initiated by the government along
with the London Business School as two British business schools trying to become graduate schools like Harvard. So I really
had a series of opportunities, which were absolutely wonderful. How many social scientists, who poke around with
questionnaires, have actually run a factory department or done industrial relations and sat with anthropologists…and then
of course I went off to the Manchester Business School.
Question: How did you fund your research?
Mumford: Being into information technology and interested in it from a human point of view it was never hard to get money.
Now, you could get some from the government funding offices, but I used to find this a waste of time. It would take nine
months to get the money, and you would get half of what you asked. So I used to just go to local industry and say: “Look,
how would you like me to do a few projects in participative design?” And an awful lot of them would say “Yes.”
Question: How did you keep the firms interested over time?
Mumford: It more or less kept going. In each project I tried to work with the group I was studying. Eventually, this became a
kind of facilitative role—making sure that management let them [employees] play a major part in the decision processes for
the system, so it was all very participative. Participation included the responsibility for designing systems with the technical
group who could not get it done on its own and ensuring that the system went in and was successfully accepted.
Question: How would you summarize these first experiences of your career?
Mumford: Very serious, useful experiences, which would be hard to replicate today, I would think.
Question: You mentioned that Joan Woodward was a major influence in your career. Can you elaborate?
Mumford: I was about 24 or 25 when I went to work with her. She was busily writing these major books asserting, quite
wrongly, now looking back, that the major influence in the industry was technology. In fact it very often wasn’t. It was more
industrial relations. So anyways, she hawked all the bookstores with this, because no one had really thought about looking
at technology as a major factor in determining what happened.
Question: Did you agree with her at the time?
Mumford: Yes, very much. She wasn’t into computers, though. I had to make it relevant to our team. The first project was
on the Liverpool docks. They had started accepting what they called a labor board to try to reduce the uncertainty for
dockers. Dockers very often only had worked some of the time and were unemployed the rest of the time. So the project
was to try to get them a permanent job. And if there wasn’t but very little work, the dockers’ labor board would still pay
them, thereby providing stability for them.
Question: How did you approach this research?
Mumford: I thought, “I must go and work on the docks,” but what can I work as, since of course there were no women
there. Well, there were two female roles. One was a dock boat scrubber, but I decided against that. I didn’t fancy that
[laughter], and it also didn’t have much to do with the dockers because the dockers are on the key side and the old
ladies—they always were old ladies—poor old things scrubbing out the boats—were in the interior of the boats. There was
another job, much better, which was a cantina assistant. There were about ten dock cantinas, which the dockers used for
meals. They were not run by the docks. One of the ones I worked in was run by the Women’s Temperament Association to
make sure that the dockers did not get lost in the fearful drinking habit [laughter].
Question: How did you see your role in the cantina?
Mumford: I had to keep changing my role. It was very interesting. In the first dock cantina I tried to go just as a normal
worker, but it was quite clear after a while that the other ladies were very suspicious of me. I would just not fit in.
Question: Why?
Mumford: Little things. I had the wrong sort of make up. I wore Elizabeth Arden lipstick, goodness gracious, and they all
had very cheap lipstick. So what was I doing there? Well I was writing books about dockers. They thought it was very
strange [laughter].
Question: Did that affect your approach?
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Mumford: Yes. In the second cantina, I did admit I was writing a book. That gave me instant acceptance with the dockers,
who loved the idea that somebody was writing a book about them having been greatly neglected. But again that caused
problems with the cantina girls. Why did anyone come to work at a cantina to write a book?
Question: Did that affect your approach again?
Mumford: Yes. In the third cantina, they just thought I was some student trying to get a little bit of cash. And that worked all
right. It was quite acceptable. Students were seen as being awkward and nosy and wanted to talk to dockers and so on, but
we were also seen as poor and wanting to earn a little bit of money, so that worked all right.
Question: But the dockers were accepting of all your research approaches?
Mumford: Oh yes. Most certainly the dockers were accepting. Liverpool has a reputation for producing lots of comedians.
They have a very strong comic sense of humor, which the cantina girls could do, but I couldn’t. So a docker would come in
and produce a few appalling remarks. [They would] come up to a cantina assistant who would more or less verbally pin
them down to the ground [laughter] and out of the cantina. I couldn’t do that. A couple of times I thought of something
clever to say, and none of it I probably should have said. I was totally hopeless [laughter].
Question: How did you get into coal mining?
Mumford: Tavistock Institute’s major piece of research was in coal mining. So the National Coal Board, another nationalist
industry, thought the Tavistock research was very good and would like a bit more done. Only this time they wanted to find
out why the coal miners were always out on strike. So they went to the Tavistock Institute and Tavistock said, “No, we do not

want to do this research because it is working for the managers and we do not want to be seen as working for the
management.” And so the Coal Board came to Liverpool, because we had done all this Tavistock stuff and said, “Well
you’ll do the research.” We were not quite so fuzzy [laughter] about working for the management. So we said we would do

it. The subject was industrial relations -- why would the coal miners always go out on strike, causing havoc. There were two
coal mines selected. One was called Maypole, which was the bad one always on strike…which I got…that was my pit. The
other one was called Chanters, which was a good pit, never on strike and had very angelic coal miners there. So I went to
Maypole, which again was when I was in my early twenties – a wonderful time.
Question: What made you go into the mine to conduct your study?
Mumford: How would I be reporting on a comparative study of a working miner’s life sitting around with a questionnaire on
the surface? [laughter] What could be dumber! [laughter] I still have my miner’s lantern, helmet and axe.
Question: How was it in the mine?
Mumford: There were many amusing episodes. I must have been approaching thirty then. People were very puritanical, and
miners swore like troopers—absolutely every kind of swearing—but they never swore in front of women. What do you do if
you have a woman suddenly underground? - A very difficult situation [laughter].
Question: Did your going into the mine work?
Mumford: Absolutely, yes. I found that it really takes time and it can be hazardous and so on, but you really get to
understand the group and what’s making them tick and why they’re doing things in certain ways.
Question: Were there other women in the mine with you?
Mumford: Oh no, no, no. No woman set foot underground. It was very nice of the mine management to let me go down.
First they used to ring around on the underground telephone to say “Watch out! She is coming!” So they’d stop swearing,
and by the time I got there I thought: “Awful, they can’t go on doing this!” Production at the pit was going to go down.
There was no swearing allowed whenever I was there. “I’ve got to do something about this.” So I produced a really good
socio-technical solution. Before I went down I used to cover myself in Chanel № 9, extremely potent perfume [laughter].
And of course underground you go around with the air, because pits have shafts—air goes down one shaft and then travels
around all the underground workings and then goes up another shaft. So you are traveling with the air and smell is very
powerful. So I was always preceded by this great blast of Chanel № 9 [laughter]. So people knew I was coming…they
would have NEVER accepted a man in the pit I was in. He would have been seen as a management’s steward at best.
Question: So being a female turned out to be an asset in this research?
Mumford: It was good that I was a woman. Yes. Yes. Yes.
Question: What did you learn in the mine as a female?
Mumford: Women really had to be underground off and on to discover why all the men were on strike. Conditions were
absolutely TERRIBLE. And the conditions also affected the wages because some of the faces were particularly difficult to cut
and to work; so if they got a very bad section or face, their earnings would go down so they usually came out on strike –
just, of course, as the dockers used to. Contrast this with Chanters, which was a fairly easy pit to work. It didn’t have these
really bad conditions.
Question: How bad were the conditions exactly?
Mumford: Maypole had actually blown up on one occasion…long before I was there. It was known as the “Maypole
disaster.” It gave the mine a bad reputation.
Question: How did you feel about your own working conditions?
Mumford: I enjoyed it enormously. I had a great time…I was not too worried about the conditions.
Question: How did you collect data?
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Mumford: I interviewed some of the miners underground. I could only do this with a few miners because it was dark down
there. I’d lie side by side with them on the coal face [laughter] because we could not sit up. I would go through the
questionnaire with them. It was hilarious.
Question: How long did you do research at Maypole and what happened then?
Mumford: That went on for a few years, and then this mysterious thing called a computer appeared and life would get very
boring after that.
Question: Why?
Mumford: Working with computers just does not compare with docks and coal mining.
Question: How did your research change?
Mumford: We got a grant from the European Productivity Association. It was quite an international group that did this early
research, and the two companies we looked at were a bank and a firm making cattle food.
Question: How would you characterize this early computer-related research?
Mumford: None of the people in research had a clue. Nobody had a clue what was going to happen with computers.
Question: How did practitioners feel about computers?
Mumford: Most people were scared stiff because they thought that they were going to lose their jobs.
Question: Why?
Mumford: They didn’t know what computers were going to do and, of course, you associate machinery usually with
replacing large numbers of people.
Question: So during the early days, the computer was considered to be just another machine that would help reduce jobs?
Mumford: Yes. Some of the computer firms like ICL produced HORRENDOUS films as marketing devices. In these films you
had an office full of about hundred workers all busily working away and the message was: “Buy our computer and you’ll
have 20 workers.” So the sales message was: “If you want to get rid of your staff, get a computer.” It was used as a sales
technique.
Question: Did people lose their jobs then?
Mumford: Of course they were right at a later date. Quite a lot of people were displaced by computers, but not at this early
period. The number of jobs didn’t go down, it went up, because you had this new and mysterious group of programmers,
which offered a great new career to male clerks. For them it was splendid. But it brought some DREADFUL jobs for women,
because this terrible punch-operating role appeared, where women had to punch the data into the computer. All the
interesting bits were done by the computer. The women had to punch the data in and collect the output, so they were just
kind of bits of machinery—machine minders. It was a very bad period for women. Computers didn’t enhance the jobs for
women AT ALL.
Question: If people did not lose their jobs, why did they continue to be afraid?
Mumford: A major problem was that there was no communication, so everyone was just left guessing. “What if these new
machines are going to put us all out of work?” There was really no communication at all. Male clerks or management
didn’t know what was going to happen.
Question: So nobody knew what the impact of computes was going to be?
Mumford: Yes. Nobody knew.
Question: Have we overcome that problem?
Mumford: The exact same major problem occurs today—management doesn’t notify you [the employee] what is going to
happen.
Question: Did you have an inclination of what the impact of computers was going to be?
Mumford: Yes. I mean our research was really about trying to find out [laughter]. We had projects going on in quite a lot of
other countries, France, Germany, probably Finland, some in Sweden, Denmark, and other parts of Europe. We all
produced these little project results, and they were more or less the same.
Question: Yesterday you said that your original message that “Systems have to be more human and people who are
affected by them must become more involved in their design” is still the same since things have not changed that much.
Mumford: Yes.
Question: What happened in your career next?
Mumford: There was a chair in dental surgery going in Manchester and Jim applied for it and didn’t get it. I thought that he
was probably going to get it, and I knew about the Manchester Business School, so I applied there for a job and I did get it.
So we ended up with me working in Manchester and him working in Liverpool, and that’s why we eventually came to live
here in Appleton. And then of course the business school was obviously interested in computers, and so I continued with my
research. Any business that was going to get anywhere started to think about introducing computers.
Question: How was your research received by the other researchers at the business school?
Mumford: With acceptance but not enthusiasm.
Question: What do you think was behind the acceptance?
Mumford: I used to go to companies for money and most companies had practical problems, so I always had a lot of
money, and one thing you find, as you must know very well, that nobody can touch you in a university department if you’ve
got money [laughter].

474

Volume 8

Issue 9

Article 2

Question: You have spent nearly half a century studying the human side of computing. How far have we come?
Mumford: It still isn’t there; most government systems over the last few years have failed. We’ve got failure after failure after
failure with very large government systems: passports, pensions for the Army. Millions have been wasted because of the
omission of the human aspects. I don’t understand why, quite honestly.
Question: In your recent book (Mumford, 2003) you say that “The world changes and technology comes and goes but
human problems remain the same.” Can you elaborate?
Mumford: They [human problems] have certainly gotten worse, if anything. They are more and more complicated.
Question: Several years ago when C. West Churchman was asked what the core values of the information systems field
should be, he said, “Ethics” (Porra, 2001). What is your response?
Mumford: I would also argue for participation. And did he also come up with the follow-up question? Nobody has strong
and powerful ethics. No kind of coherent ethical presence ever has emerged. He says it’s all about ethics, but nobody
around is actually producing the ethics. The trouble with the Tavistock Institute was that they never went into the IT
area…never had anything to do with IT, although that’s astounding. So you can raise the question where are the ethics?
Systems analysts, on the whole, are more into the technical design of the system.
Question: What is your follow up question?
Mumford: Why don’t people with social knowledge use their knowledge in systems design? I can follow up by saying that
still nobody takes much notice of the people factor, because the people with the social knowledge are not using it in
information system design. Why is nobody thinking about it?
Question: You are saying that no ethical process has emerged in information system design, but your method, ETHICS,
describes an ethical way to design information systems.
Mumford: Oh yes, yes, but how far have I ever penetrated? I have gotten high marks from a “utopian correct.”
Question: How do you see the future of ETHICS and an ethical approach to information system design?
Mumford: It could be on the verge of reappearing. People are going to want this more participative involved, LEARNING. It
[ETHICS] is a learning approach, because you learn how to manage change and how to create a system with ethics
designed into it.
Question: Who is going to drive the change toward more ethical information systems?
Mumford: It has got to come from senior management. I think this is the trouble. You get a few IT mavericks, who don’t
have a clue. It has really got to come from management.
Question: Have any of the firms you worked for maintained an ethical, participative approach to information system
design?
Mumford: The number one that is still going and really HAS TO nowadays is Shell, but it is an example of a company that
HAS HAD TO, because it had to drill oil wells. It had to get the local population’s support. It had to have an exchange
program. “So if you let us drill our oil well, we will build a school or a hospital etc. for you.” So it was sort of an exchange
relationship. And the company has been doing it for 50 years so it is not an on/off thing with Shell, but it is a swap.
Question: Can you name examples of managers who have succeeded in introducing ethical information systems in their
firms?
Mumford: Well Digital for example, when Ken Olsen—Digital Equipment Corporation does not exist anymore—but Ken
Olsen had an ethical approach. So I did a lot of work at Digital over the years. He paid my salary for a while. So, “Why has
no ethical process emerged in information system design?” is really a very interesting question to pose.
Question: Could we perhaps rather say that no ethical information system design process has been popularized? You have
provided the world with ETHICS.
Mumford: Probably a better way to say it is to say that an ethical information system design process has not yet been
popularized.
Question: How would you describe the state of ethically motivated information systems?
Mumford: They are like tiny flowers appearing in a cage, some soon tumbled on and some are being passed along.
Question: Do you believe that information systems designed on inferior ethical principles had to do with the demise of
companies like Enron and Arthur Andersen?
Mumford: Well their demise was caused by people who were just crooks.
Question: Could these types of events cause people to be more skeptical about the information systems companies rely on.
Mumford: Oh yes…at least for a while.
Question: Do you think that events like these have a long-term impact in terms of a demand for more ethical information
system design processes?
Mumford: No. I think it is going to make people much more careful and suspicious, but I don’t think that there is a logical
jump into being more involved and participative, because that would be a most INCREDIBLY HUGE cultural jump, wouldn’t
it? I think the attitude is, “We’re going to watch out in the future and see that they don’t get away with it” or “We are going

to police better.”

Question: How has your message changed over the years?
Mumford: I am still repeating the same old message from years ago, accepting the difference that systems are getting more
complicated and the cost of failure is getting more expensive. People want to be involved more in designing work
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organizations that are for them, so they don’t want some unknown group coming in and doing it all. They want to be
playing a part themselves. And the risks and costs are increasing all the time. So a much more human approach to systems
design is required.
Question: What should universities do in order to reinforce your message?
Mumford: I raise the question: “Why are there so few of these human-oriented approaches being taught in IT courses and

in business schools in general?”

Question: What should the information systems research field do?
Mumford: We need to think about the ethics notion a stage further, and so we need ethics but what kind of ethics do we
need and how do we get these familiarized and accepted?
Question: What would make companies more interested?
Mumford: Well, cash really. Firms are putting out a lot money on systems.
Question: Would methods to find out the financial benefits of ethical information systems help?
Mumford: Even if you use financial justifications, firms do not do the costing. They don’t usually cost the necessity or the
importance of people who leave or the people who are absolutely fed up. So they are not going to know the difference.
These things are not costs. Companies are after the “easy technical things” like how much did the physical system cost?
They’ll never take into account this HUGE blank area of the human side of computing.
Question: What can researchers do in order to help firms visualize the ‘blank area’?
Mumford: Researchers can do some costing for the company. “How many staff have you lost because they don’t like this
new system?” ”How much has this [system] cost you to use it” Who does these calculations? Probably nobody. A thing, of
course, which does require some very interesting work to do, is that you’ve got to demonstrate that ethically designed
information systems—if you should find any—actually do make some money or increase job-satisfaction and that the share
price goes up as a result.
Question: Do you believe that the current disinterest in finding out about the cost of dissatisfied employees has to do with
the job market? For example, in the U.S. the job market is really tough at the moment, and it is very easy to find employees.
Perhaps it is really a bad time for an employee to stand up about feeling treated poorly?
Mumford: Yes. Times may be against an ethical approach. After the war, Scandinavia, in particular, couldn’t get staff; so
they had to provide an attractive job environment in order to attract people to Volvo, etc. At one time the Norwegian
government had improving job satisfaction as a legal job requirement. Where would you find that now?
Question: Where did we go wrong?
Mumford: I think doing things like business process reengineering were negative in their consequences. They led people
down paths that didn’t work, but they were marketed in such a way that they sounded very attractive. It was a closed door
really. Another interesting question is, “How is this quality of working life accepted very much for shop floor systems but
never for these new IT systems?” It’s an interesting question.
Question: If one would ask in the United States: “Why do computer people in many cases have no concern for the human
side?” or “Why are our exams technically oriented?” one could imagine business school professors saying, “But that is not
true! We are considering the human side and that is our core competency.” How would you respond to that?
Mumford: And so what are you doing? And what they are they doing is having a few little ideas in their own heads that they
assume have to do with the problem, but they are not actually going and testing them.
Question: What is your take on research trends like e-commerce or knowledge management that seem to attract a large
following of researchers?
Mumford: Well, they’ll go out of interest and then you write it off with no outcome. The field can say all it wants that “We’re
all about human,” but then when you have a guest speech about the human side of things, you don’t get anybody.
Somebody might raise a little flag occasionally just to show that the human side of computing hasn’t been totally forgotten.
But that’s about it.
Question: One last question. Throughout the day you have said you have been lucky. Why? It seems that you were more
talented than lucky.
Mumford: I was lucky...
Enid shows her garden and we take pictures outside…
Mumford: Jim takes care of the garden; while I write books…There is so much to write about…
It was drizzling. Air smelled fresh and the garden was full of bright colors. We were slowly getting wet. We didn’t notice.
Mumford: Good ideas are like flowers. You just have to keep those flowers coming up and maybe some of them will survive
[laughter]. Yes, keep the flowers coming up…

Enid’s Legacy
Enid Mumford’s four theoretical foundations allowed her to extend her legacy far beyond ETHICS and the human use of
computers. In the last decades of her career, Enid applied ethics, socio-technical theory, systems theory, and the principles
of action research to methods for solving “wicked problems” of humankind such as those related to drugs, cyber crime, and
money laundering. Central characteristics of these kinds of problems are that they spread unhindered to regions, countries

476

Volume 8

Issue 9

Article 2

and economic activities; are perceived as risks by some and as opportunities by others; and promote fear (Mumford, 1999).
They are resistant to solutions. They morph. They are cloudy, complex and uncertain. Their solutions are difficult or
impossible to implement. They are supported by the latest technologies. Failure to address this category of problems can
lead to a totally corrupt global capitalism and to a worldwide criminal economy.
Wicked, global problems require problem solving methods that match them in variety (Mumford, 1999). Such methods
must provide tools for gathering, analyzing, and synthesizing information; relating information to past, current and future
events; and combining information with considered actions, often on the spot and under stress to capture a window of
opportunity. These methods have to include feedback on the impact of the solution and a way to implement adjustments on
the method and on the actions. They need to allow for creativity in response to unanticipated turns of events. Enid warns
that this is a description of global problem solving for a regular, orderly world situated in an environment that changes little.
Today this “comfortable situation” is hard to find.
Against the backdrop of Enid Mumford’s career, it is difficult to escape the feeling that the efforts of the information systems
research field as a whole are somewhat misplaced. As Enid said in the interview, as a field, we tend to become infatuated
with topics that “will go out of interest” and then we “write them off with no outcome.” As a discipline, we can say all we
want that we are all about the human use of computers, but when it comes down to doing research on topics that really
matter from the perspective of humankind and in the long run, “We don’t get anybody.” Enid Mumford’s life and career
serve as a reminder that ethical and human use of computers is a topic that never ceases to be current and of essential
importance, measured by values well beyond the boundaries of our discipline. Whilst her death was mourned by all, she set
an example for the rest of us to follow. She has been—and will continue to be—an inspiration to us all.
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